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WHAT’S IN A NAME? THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF NAMING FORCED
MARRIAGE AS A SEPARATE CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
Krista Stout*

Visibility and accountability for gender crimes through international justice mechanisms can
advance the cause of justice for women.
For only when sexual violence is perceived as a political event, when it is made public and analyzed, can its causes and contexts be probed and strategies to overcome it be considered.

INTRODUCTION

The  phenomenon  of  forced  marriages  during  armed  conﬂict  has  recently  garnered  in-‐‑
ternational   a ention,   as   it   has   become   apparent   that   these   coerced   relationships   are  
not   mere   happenstance,   but   are   o en   the   result   of   strategic   planning   on   the   part   of  
armed   groups   and   are   thus   an   integral   part   of   ongoing   conﬂicts   around   the   globe.    
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to critically examine the phenomenon as it
manifests  itself  in  armed  conﬂict  situations,  with  a  speciﬁc  focus  on  Sierra  Leone,  and  
to  unpack  the  various  violations  that  occur  under  the  guise  of  this  pernicious  label-‐‑
ling  to  see  whether  it  is  desirable  and  justiﬁable  to  name  forced  marriage  as  a  separate  
crime under international humanitarian law (IHL), or whether the phenomenon is ad-‐‑
equately  addressed  within  the  framework  of  existing  IHL.    I  will  ultimately  argue  that  
the recognition of this separate and distinct crime under IHL is a necessary and logical
development in the law, as it forms part of a trend toward increasing recognition of the
*       Krista  Stout  has  received  a  B.A.  in  the  ﬁeld  of  history  and  a  joint  B.C.L./LL.B.  from  McGill  
University.  She  is  currently  articling  with  Torys  LLP  in  Toronto  and  would  like  to  thank  the  J.S.D.  
Tory Fund for its support.
1       Binaifer  Nowrojee,  “Making  the  Invisible  War  Crime  Visible:  Post-‐‑Conﬂict  Justice  for  Sierra  
Leone’s Rape Victims” (2005) 18 Harv. Rts. J. 85 at 88.
2         A.L.  Barstow,  War’s Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes against Women (Cleveland:
Pilgrim  Press,  2000),  as  cited  in  Eugenia  Trabucchi,  “Rape  Warfare  and  International  Humanitarian  
Law”  (2008)  4  Journal  of  the  Sociology  of  Self-‐‑Knowledge  39  at  47.  
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unique  gender-‐‑based  harms  that  women  and  girls  face  within  armed  conﬂict.    
While some authors have argued that naming the crime forced marriage  leads  to  a  “com-‐‑
plete misrepresentation and distortion” of the women and girls’ experience within
these relationships,3 this paper will argue that it is not the naming of forced marriage
as a crime that will lead to this misrepresentation and distortion. The ultimate goal in
arguing for the naming of forced marriage as a separate and distinct crime under IHL
is  to  help  avert,  at  least  partly,  this  body  of  law  inscribing  and  reinforcing  a  “partial  and  
distorted  vision  of  women  that  has  li le  to  do  with  the  reality  of  their  lives,  or  the  way  
they experience warfare.”4 This article will suggest that naming is an important step
in rendering this crime visible and thus in enabling the international community to
express its condemnation of forced marriage, but more importantly in giving voice to
the experience of the women and girls who are coerced into forced marital relations.
The  ﬁrst  section  of  this  article  provides  a  contextual  backdrop  to  the  discussion  to  fol-‐‑
low  by  presenting  the  experiences  of  the  “wives”  of  Sierra  Leone  in  their  own  words,  
thus  allowing  for  the  formulation  of  a  deﬁnition  of  forced  marriage  that  captures  the  
true   nature   of   these   “marriages”   as   they   are   understood   by   aﬀected   Sierra   Leonean  
women and girls. The second section introduces the 2008 decision of the Special Court
of   Sierra   Leone   (SC-‐‑SL)   in   Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, et. al., which found that
forced marriages are a crime against humanity. The third section addresses the con-‐‑
stituent elements of the overarching crime of forced marriage, namely sexual slavery
and enslavement, other sexual violence, and the use of child soldiers, to show how
prosecution  of  the  individual  components  of  forced  marriage  is  inadequate.    The  ﬁnal  
section argues that naming forced marriages as a separate crime within IHL is essential
in  that  it  forms  part  of  a  recent  trend  of  gendering  IHL,  gives  voice  to  the  victim-‐‑wives,  
and  may  have  a  normative  and  practical  inﬂuence  beyond  the  boundaries  of  IHL.  

I. FORCED MARRIAGES IN CONTEXT
1. Women’s Experiences under Forced Marriages
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  present  a  practical  backdrop  to  the  more  theoretical  
legal discussion to follow. As this paper ultimately argues that forced marriage should
be considered and named as a separate crime under IHL, it is important to begin with
3     Graça  Machel,  Govt’  of  Canada,  Int’l  Conf.  on  War-‐‑Aﬀected  Children:  The Impact of Armed
Conﬂict  on  Children  (2000),  ch.  2,  para.  3,  as  cited  in  Karine  Bélair,  “Unearthing  the  Customary  
Law Foundations of ‘Forced Marriages’ During Sierra Leone’s Civil War: The Possible Impact of
International  Criminal  Law  on  Customary  Marriage  and  Women’s  Rights  in  Post-‐‑  Conﬂict  Sierra  
Leone”  (2006)  15:3  Colum.  J.  Gender  &  L.  551  at  553.  
4       Judith  G.  Gardam  &  Michelle  J.  Jarvis,  Women,  Armed  Conﬂict  and  International  Law (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 251.
5
Prosecutor v. Brima, et. al.,  Case  No.  SCSL-‐‑2004-‐‑16-‐‑A,  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone,  Judgment,  
Appeals Chamber, 22 February 2008 at para. 2 [Brima II].
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an examination of the phenomenon as it actually plays out in real women’s lives in con-‐‑
ﬂict  situations,  in  order  to  ensure  that  it  is,  indeed,  something  that  is  capable  of  being  
stigmatized and that should be criminalized. Also, as it will be argued that the naming
of this crime is important in the sense that it might help give voice to women who have
suﬀered  within  these  “marriages,”  it  is  essential  to  present  the  experiences  of  women  
in their own words – to the extent possible – to ensure that any legal regulation or pros-‐‑
ecution  eﬀectively  captures  the  true  nature  of  this  crime.    “We  need  to  ask  the  girls  to  
tell  their  own  stories  of  war  […]  rather  than  assuming  the  right  to  speak  for  them;”6 for
to  do  otherwise  is  to  risk  that  the  proposed  naming  becomes  a  self-‐‑defeating  exercise.    
Furthermore,  while  the  discussion  below  focuses  speciﬁcally  on  Sierra  Leone,  this  is  
not to suggest that the phenomenon is limited to this region. There are reports of these
coerced unions in Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique, the DRC, Algeria, Kashmir,
East Timor, and Afghanistan.7 The purpose of this section, therefore, is to provide a
contextualized  analysis  of  forced  marriages  to  make  them  more  visible  and  to  ensure  
that they can be documented and recognized wherever they appear.

2. Forced Marriages in Sierra Leone
The devastating civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 and raged until 2001 has
been  characterized  by  some  as  the  “war  against  women,”  due  to  the  exceptionally  high  
recorded  rates  of  violence  against  women  and  girls  during  the  conﬂict  period.8 The
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Violence Against Women estimates that
72%  of  Sierra  Leonean  women  and  girls  suﬀered  human  rights  abuses,  and  that  over  
50% of them were victims of sexual violence.9 Within this general climate of gender vi-‐‑
olence, mostly girls, but some women, were abducted and brought to the rebel camps
of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC),  and  the  West  Side  Boys,  where  they  became  the  “wives”  of  combatants  and  
commanders in the camps.10 While the exact number of women and girls who were
6       C.  Nordstrom,  Girls and Warzones: Troubling Questions (Upsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1997)
at  36,  as  cited  in  Myriam  Denov,  Girls in Fighting Forces: Moving Beyond Victimhood (Canadian
International  Development  Agency,  2007)  at  4.  
7     Katerina  Novotna,  “Forced  Marriage  in  the  Jungle:  Time  to  Stop  Beating  About  the  Bush”  (2007)  
81  Aust.  L.J.  302  at  FN  1.  
8     Jeanne  Ward,  “Gender  Based  Violence  among  Conﬂict-‐‑aﬀected  Populations:  Humanitarian  
Program  Responses”  in  Helen  Durham  &  Tracy  Gurd,  eds.,  Listening to the Silences: Women and War
(Leiden:  Martinus  Nĳhoﬀ  Publishers,  2005)  67  at  78.  
9
See Nowrojee, supra  note  1  at  86.  
10   While  there  is  no  exact  data  on  the  age  of  the  women  and  girls  taken  as  “wives,”  qualitative  
research  studies  indicate  that  the  majority  of  these  “wives”  were  girls,  rather  than  adult  women,  with  
most  commanders’  wives  ranging  in  age  from  9  to  19  (Augustine  Park,  “Other  Inhumane  Acts:  Forced  
Marriage,  Girl  Soldiers  and  the  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone”  (2006)  15:3  Social  &  Legal  Studies  315  
at  322).  This  conclusion  is  further  supported  by  the  fact  that  25%  of  all  cases  of  ‘sexual  slavery’  heard  
before the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission involved girls who were 12 years and
younger (ibid.  at  323).  However,  adult  women  were  forced  into  these  “marriages”  as  well.  Human  
Rights  Watch  reports  that  one  50  year  old  woman  was  abducted  in  Freetown  and  taken  as  the  wife  
of  commander  “Bird  Bod”  who  was  in  his  thirties  (Human  Rights  Watch,  “We’ll  Kill  You  if  You  Cry:  
Sexual  Violence  in  the  Sierra  Leone  Conﬂict”  (January  2003)  15:1(A)  Human  Rights  Watch  1  at  38)  
[HRW].
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coerced   into   “marriage”   to   their   captors   remains   unknown,   one   population-‐‑based  
study  done  by  Physicians  for  Human  Rights  found  that  9%  (or  nine  out  of  ninety-‐‑four  
women) reported a forced marriage.11
These forced marriages typically began with the forcible abduction of the women and
girls  during  brutal  a acks  on  their  towns.    Binta  K.,  an  eighteen  year  old  girl  who  be-‐‑
came  a  rebel’s  “wife,”  describes  her  experience  as  follows:  
As the rebels were pulling out of Freetown, they came to our house and
captured  us.    They  even  killed  some  of  the  other  girls  in  our  house.  I  was  
hiding with some girls when they found us. We were told that if we didn’t
come  with  them,  they’d  kill  us.    While  I  was  begging  them  not  to  take  me,  a  
li le  boy,  about  ten  years  old  who  was  with  them  piped  up  “If  she  doesn’t  
want to come, pass her over to me and I’ll chop her hands.” I agreed to go.
I was raped and held there in the bush. I wanted to run away, to escape,
but  there  was  no  way.    If  you  were  caught  trying  to  escape,  you  were  killed  
or put in a box.12
Another thirteen year old girl, M.F., who was abducted from Koinadugu town in 1998
a er  an  RUF/AFRC  a ack,  recounts  being  gang-‐‑raped  by  the  rebels  before  being  “giv-‐‑
en to one of them” as his wife: “They forced me to go down on my hands and knees with
my  bo om  in  the  air  and  raped  me  both  vaginally  and  anally.  Five  rebels  raped  me  on  that  ﬁrst  
day.”13
These  women  and  girls  were  then  assigned  to  a  “husband”  and  taken  back  to  the  camp.    
A small number of the girls were married in formal ceremonies, with a commander
oﬃciating,14  while  the  majority  were  simply  distributed  to  the  men,  with  “marriage”  
taking  the  form  of  a  unilateral  assertion  by  the  “husband.”    One  woman,  I.S.,  describes  
the wife selection process in the following words:
One   of   the   commanders   said   he   was   going   to   amputate   all   of   us.   But  
another  commander  C.O.  Blood,  said  “Don’t  kill  them,  let’s  choose  them  as  
wives.” Then we were divided up. The one who seemed to be in charge,
C.O.  Blood,  chose  me.    When  he  looked  at  me  I  was  frightened.    His  pupils  
were huge – he was high on drugs.15
Despite  the  lack  of  formalities,  many  of  the  girls  felt  that  they  did,  in  fact,  belong  to  the  
11 Physicians for Human Rights, War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-Based
Assessment (Physicians  for  Human  Rights,  2002)  at  48  [Physicians].  This  report  also  concludes,  how-‐‑
ever, that sexual violence and forced marriage was probably underreported.
12 Ibid. at 70.
13   HRW, supra  note  10  at  30.  
14 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case  No.  SCSL-‐‑04-‐‑16-‐‑T,  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone,  
Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 20 June 2007, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7
(Sexual  Slavery)  and  Count  8  (‘Forced  Marriages’),  581  at  paras.  43-‐‑44  [Doherty  Dissent].  
15 HRW, supra  note  10  at  46.  
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men  who  had  claimed  them.    One  ﬁ een  year  old  girl,  Isatu,  explains  how,  “when they
capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you. I was married to him.”6
At   the   camp,   the   women   and   girls   were   forced   to   perform   various   tasks,   including  
cooking,  cleaning,  washing  clothes,  carrying  ammunition  and  looted  items,  and  farm  
work,  as  well  as  providing  sexual  services  for  their  “husbands.”17 One woman, testify-‐‑
ing before the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), explained her
duties in the following words:
I  later  got  forcefully  married  to  “DU-‐‑DU  Boy”  as  my  “bush  husband”.    I  
was  then  assigned  to  the  responsibilities  of  doing  all  the  laundry,  cooking  
their food, ironing their clothes and many other household duties. Most of
their clothes had blood stains on them. Some of the female abductees who
refused  to  have  sex  with  them  were  killed.    That  gave  me  the  cause  to  yield  
to their sexual demands in order to save my life.18
Another   abductee   echoes   a   similar   experience:   “I became wife to another Commander
named Mohammed. As usual, my duties were to prepare food and to satisfy him sexually, any
time he needs me.”19    Not  all  “wives”  were  subjected  to  rape  and  sexual  violence,  how-‐‑
ever.    HRW  reports  that  “one  Commander  […]  prevented  the  rape  of  an  eight-‐‑year-‐‑old  
girl  by  a  ten-‐‑year-‐‑old  child  combatant  by  ordering  him  to  use  her  ‘only  for  cooking  
and cleaning for now.’”20    Furthermore,  not  all  “wives”  were  forced  to  perform  routine  
labour.    One  witness  before  the  SC-‐‑SL  claimed  that  she  was  “not  forced  to  do  any  work  
for Colonel Z.”21 It seems, however, that sexual violence and forced labour were the
norm.
These  marriages  were  o en,  although  not  always,  characterized  by  a  degree  of  exclu-‐‑
sivity  in  which  the  “wife”  was  protected  against  sexual  violence  from  other  men.    As  
one girl stated,
At  the  beginning,  I  was  raped  daily  […]  I  was  every  man’s  wife.    But  later,  
one  of  them,  an  oﬃcer,  had  a  special  interest  in  me.    He  then  protected  me  
against others and never allowed others to use me. He continued to [rape
me] alone and less frequently.22
This  exclusive  arrangement  of  “husband”  and  “wife”  was  not  always  protective,  how-‐‑
16   Amnesty International, Sierra  Leone:  Childhood:  A  Casualty  of  Conﬂict  (2000),  as  cited  in  Park,  supra
note  10  at  315.
17 HRW, supra  note  10  at  43-‐‑44.
18    The  Sierra  Leone  Truth  &  Reconciliation  Commission,  Witness to the Truth: Report of the Sierra
Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission (5  October  2004)  at  para.  211  [TRC].  
19 TRC, supra note 18 at para. 211.
20 HRW, supra  note  10  at  46.
21 Doherty Dissent, supra  note  14  at  para.  43.  
22 Denov, supra  note  6  at  9.
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ever,  as  some  of  the  women  were  raped  while  their  “husbands”  were  out  on  patrol.23
Some  “husbands”  also  oﬀered  their  “wives”  to  other  men  for  sexual  purposes.    One  
woman,  speaking  before  the  TRC,  maintained  that  “if there is a bachelor amongst them,
those that didn’t have women were free to go and pick any woman to make them happy for
the night.”24    Regardless  of  their  treatment  at  the  hands  of  their  “husbands,”  however,  
“wives”  were  expected  to  be  intimate  with  them  and  to  show  them  love  and  aﬀection.    
This  perverse  element  of  the  forced  “marriage”  is  captured  by  the  following  statement  
made by I.S., who was abducted by the AFRC in 1999:
We  stayed  there  for  months  and  they  were  always  going  on  a acks  in  the  
Port  Loko  area.    Occasionally  C.O.  Blood  was  nice  to  me  and  I  had  to  kiss  
him  and  play  love  with  him.    But  I  could  never  tell  him  what  was  really  
in  my  heart;  that  I  missed  my  family  and  wanted  to  escape.    Other  days  
he  would  beat  me  for  nothing.  He  did  the  same  thing  to  his  other  “wife.”    
Neither of us could complain.25
Beyond  sexual  violence,  “wives”  were  also  subjected  to  intense  forms  of  physical  vio-‐‑
lence and forced drug use, which helped create an environment of psychological terror
that   ensured   submission.      H.K.,   a   sixteen-‐‑year-‐‑old   who   was   accused   of   stealing   her  
“husband”  Colonel  Jaja’s  money,  remembers  this  experience:    
Then  the  rebels  took  me  into  a  stream  and  tied  me  to  a  tree  in  the  water.    
They  told  people  to  beat  me.    I  was  in  water  up  to  my  head.    “Jaja”  said  the  
boys should cut down the tree and let me drown. I was there for several
days,  maybe  up  to  a  week  or  so.    Once  a  water  snake  swam  by  and  ate  my  
foot  in  the  water.    When  I  was  tied  there,  Jaja  cut  my  neck  and  put  cocaine  
into  my  body.    He  also  gave  me  marĳuana  cigare es  to  smoke.    Finally  he  
untied me and put me in an old container where I stayed for several days.
While  in  the  guardroom  Jaja  and  Alhaji  “Cold  Boots”  came  several  times  
to give me drugs.26
Other women and girls were physically mutilated when their husbands carved their
faction’s  le ers  into  the  bodies  of  their  “wives,”  making  escape  much  more  diﬃcult,  as  
they  were  physically  branded  as  rebels  and  risked  being  killed  by  government  forces.27
Even  without  these  physical  markings,  however,  escape  was  diﬃcult  and  many  of  the  
“wives”  felt  powerless  to  even  try.  
There  is  also  evidence  that  “husbands”  exerted  near-‐‑total  control  over  their  wives’  re-‐‑
23 HRW, supra note  10  at  41;  43-‐‑45.  
24   TRC, supra note  18  at  para.  302.  
25 HRW, supra  note  10  at  44.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  feature  of  forced  intimacy  has  been  
used  by  senior  ﬁgures  in  the  RUF,  who  were  interviewed  by  HRW,  to  deny  that  any  violence  had  hap-‐‑
pened. They claimed that these women and girls had joined the movement voluntarily, and simply
fallen  in  “love”  with  their  “husbands”  (ibid.  at  46).  
26   Ibid.  at  33.  
27 Ibid.  at  43-‐‑44.  See  also  TRC,  supra note 18 at para. 218.
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productive freedom. I.S. recalls unsuccessfully trying to abort the baby she was to
have with her rebel husband: “He  warned  me  that  if  I  tried  to  ﬂush  the  baby  out,  he’d  kill  
me. He said he wanted the baby and hoped it would be a boy.”28 Although less documented,
there  are  stories  of  forced  abortions  as  well.    M.K.,  the  abducted  “wife”  of  one  of  the  
West  Side  Boys,  reported  that  “the rebels saw that I was pregnant and said to Umaro, ‘We
are not going to work along with any pregnant woman, we should kill her.’ Umaro said that he
wanted to take me as his wife and that I should be given an injection instead.”29
Women  and  girls  in  these  camps  were  not  merely  “wives,”  however,  as  many  of  them  
were trained and participated in direct combat as well. McKay and Mazurana claim
that  “sixty  percent  of  the  girls  involved  with  ﬁghting  forces  in  Sierra  Leone  acted  as  
‘wives.’”30 Moreover, these authors note that a certain number of the Commanders’
“wives”  were  put  in  charge  of  small  boys  units  (SBU)  and  small  girls  units  (SGU)  with-‐‑
in the group.31 Some of these girls and women were therefore actively engaged in
commi ing  atrocities.    As  one  girl  recounts,  “a er  the  training  with  the  guns,  they  would  
bring someone for us to kill. Each of us was forced to kill.”32
The roles of these women and girls within the camps were thus complex, as was their
relationships   with   their   “husbands”   and   other   “wives”   in   the   camp.      Not   all   of   the  
“husbands”  physically  abused  their  wives  and  some  of  them  tried  to  stop  others  from  
misusing  their  own  “wives.”    H.K.,  the  wife  of  “Jaja,”  claims  that  her  husband’s  com-‐‑
manding  oﬃcer  used  to  criticize  him  for  the  way  he  treated  his  wives:  “Colonel Stagger
used to say, ‘Look, when we take these kids, we should take care of them and now you beat her for
nothing.’ Jaja used to say it was not Stagger’s business. Stagger’s own abductees were treated
pre y  well.  He  never  beat  them.”33 Also, there was a clear hierarchy within which com-‐‑
manders’  “wives”  exerted  a  fair  degree  of  power  over  others,  at  least  within  the  RUF  
compounds, and made decisions about the distribution of food and looted items and
disciplinary  actions  in  the  absence  of  their  “husbands.”34
The  trauma  suﬀered  by  these  “wives”  did  not  necessarily  end  if  they  managed  to  es-‐‑
cape  or  were  released  at  the  end  of  the  armed  conﬂict.    While  some  were  welcomed  
back  into  their  communities,  many  that  returned  faced  rejection,  stigma  and  isolation  
due  to  their  “marital”  association  with  the  men  who  had  brutalized  their  communi-‐‑
ties,  and  the  violence  that  was  done  to  them  within  these  “marriages.”    The  story  of  
Aminata  K.,  who  was  forced  to  marry  a  West  Side  Boy  named  James,  is  illustrative  of  
the  plight  of  a  countless  number  of  “ex-‐‑wives”:  
28 HRW, ibid.  at  40.  See  also  TRC,  ibid. at  para.  306.  
29 HRW, supra  note  10  at  40.
30     Park,  supra  note  10  at  316.  
31     Susan  McKay  &  Dyan  E.  Mazurana,  Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern
Uganda,  Sierra  Leone  and  Mozambique:  Their  Lives  During  and  A er  War  (Montreal: Rights and
Democracy,  2004)  at  94.  
32   Denov, supra note  6  at  6.  
33   HRW, supra  note  10  at  44.
34     McKay  &  Mazurana,  supra  note  31  at  93.  
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Since   returning   from   her   captivity,   her   husband   le    her   and   they   have  
divorced.    She  said  that  a er  she  returned  he  kept  saying,  “this  is  not  my  
child  –  you  are  pregnant  with  child  –  this  is  not  my  child,”  and  a er  a  few  
months  he  le   her.    She  wanted  to  abort  using  herbs,  but  her  family  asked  
her  not  to  as  it  might  kill  her  and  oﬀered  to  help  raise  the  new  child.    She  
said she is worried, however, because she has no husband or means and is
completely dependent.35
Moreover,  an  unknown  number  of  “wives”  still  remain  with  their  “husbands”  today.    
Some  stay  because  they  “adjusted  to  the  level  of  violence  with  the  rebels,  which  over  
time became normal,”36  and  established  a  form  of  surrogate  “family”  within  the  camp.    
Some, perhaps, stay by choice. Others stay because there is no other choice, as their
social  and  economic  options  in  the  post-‐‑conﬂict  world  are  bleak,  particularly  if  they  
have  children  from  their  “marriage.”37

3. A Contextualized Definition of Forced Marriages
Drawing on the above stories, it is clear that while these women’s experiences of forced
marriage  –  and  their  perceptions  of  their  identities  and  roles  as  “wives”  –  shared  many  
similar characteristics, they were not monolithically the same. Most of them were sub-‐‑
jected  to  sexual  violence,  while  others’  “wifely  duties”  included  only  domestic  labour.    
Some   were   actively   engaged   in   combat,   while   others   were   relegated   to   the   “home”  
front.     And   while   the   post-‐‑conﬂict   situation   for   the   majority   of   the   “ex-‐‑wives”   was  
grim, this, too, was not universally the case. What is true for all of these women, as is
evident  within  the  narratives  above,  is  that  the  “wives”  did  not  choose  their  status,  but  
were  labelled  as  such  through  either  force  or  coercion,  o en  in  the  context  of  excep-‐‑
tional violence and fear.38 Consent to marriage was therefore entirely absent, either on
the part of the girl or woman herself, or on the part of her family.39 What this reality
suggests  is  that  forced  marriages  are  those  in  which  the  term  “marriage”  serves  not  
only  to  mask  the  gendered  violence  occurring  below  the  surface  of  the  relationship,  
but   also   to   bind   the   women/girls   to   their   captors/“husbands”   through   the   use   of   a  
label  that  has  important  social  and  cultural  connotations.    As  Scharf  and  Ma ler  note,  
“by   virtue   of   a aching   the   rights   of   a   spouse   to   her,   her   ‘husband’   traps   her   within  
the forced marriage through social and cultural mores in place to protect valid mar-‐‑

35   Physicians, supra  note  11  at  66.  
36   HRW, supra  note  10  at  44.
37   Ibid.  at  44-‐‑45.  
38   Nowrojee, supra note 1 at 102.
39     This  is  not  to  suggest  that  a  “wife”  could  not  later  consent  to  her  assumed  marital  status  and  
relationship  if  she  were  genuinely  free  to  leave  the  relationship  and  chose  not  to.    See  Kelly  D.  Askin,  
“The  Jurisprudence  of  the  International  War  Crimes  Tribunals:  Securing  Gender  Justice  for  Some  
Survivors”,  in  Durham  &  Gurd,  supra  note  8,  125  at  149.
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riages.”40 It is the label itself, and the way in which it is so violently imposed, that sepa-‐‑
rates  this  phenomenon  from  other  acts  of  gender  discrimination  and/or  violations  that  
women  experience  within  armed  conﬂicts.    The  use  of  the  marker  “wife”  has  long-‐‑term  
psychological  and  social  consequences  for  the  women  and  girls;  thus,  for  the  purposes  
of this paper, it is the forced imposition of the status of marriage itself upon the woman
or girl, and not merely the various violations that she experiences within the context of
her relationship, that is to be considered a crime.

II. FORCED MARRIAGE AS AN “OTHER INHUMANE ACT”: BRIMA II
The  SC-‐‑SL  is  a  “hybrid”  court  that  was  jointly  set  up  by  the  United  Nations  and  the  
government of Sierra Leone in 2002. Its mandate is to prosecute crimes against human-‐‑
ity, war crimes, and other serious violations of IHL and Sierra Leonean law, and to try
those   who   bear   the   “greatest   responsibility”   for   the   atrocities   commi ed  during   the  
civil war.41    The  Statute  of  the  SC-‐‑SL  explicitly  refers  to  certain  crimes  of  sexual  violence,  
including  “rape,  sexual  slavery,  enforced  prostitution,  forced  pregnancy  and  any  other  
form of sexual violence” which can be prosecuted as crimes against humanity when
commi ed  as  “part  of  a  widespread  or  systematic  a ack  against  any  civilian  popula-‐‑
tion.”42    The  Statute  also  expressly  lists  “rape,  enforced  prostitution  and  any  form  of  
indecent assault” as serious violations of IHL, which can be tried as war crimes.43 The
explicit  naming  of  these  crimes  has  provided  a  viable  framework  from  which  to  ex-‐‑
plore  forced  marriages  in  conﬂict  situations.    In  fact,  in  its  landmark  2008  judgment,  
Brima II,  the  Appeals  Chamber  of  the  SC-‐‑SL  set  international  precedent  by  ruling  that  
forced  marriage  constitutes  a  crime  against  humanity,  as  an  “Other  Inhumane  Act.”    
The  three  accused,  Brima,  Kamara,  and  Kanu,  who  all  held  senior  command  positions  
in the AFRC, had been charged with six counts of serious violations of IHL, seven
counts  of  crimes  against  humanity,  and  one  count  of  “other  serious  violations”  of  IHL,  
namely   the   use   of   child   soldiers.      The   Prosecutor   speciﬁcally   charged   the   three   ac-‐‑
40     Michael  P.  Scharf  &  Suzanne  Ma ler,  “Forced  Marriages,  Exploring  the  Viability  of  the  Special  
Court of Sierra Leone’s New Crime Against Humanity” (October 2005) Case Research Papers Series
in  Legal  Studies,  Working  Paper  05-‐‑35  at  9.  The  authors  provide  as  an  example  the  fact  that  under  
certain customary marriages in Sierra Leone, the dissolution of a marital relationship requires the
permission of the woman’s relatives. In the context of the forced marriages as seen in the stories
above,  these  women  were  entirely  cut  oﬀ  from  their  communities  and  families  making  the  usual  
customs surrounding the end of marriages impossible to follow.
41   Brima II, supra note  5  at  para.  2.  The  SC-‐‑SL’s  jurisdiction  is  temporally  limited  to  events  that  oc-‐‑
curred  a er  November  30,  1996.  Regarding  Sierra  Leonean  law,  the  SC-‐‑SL  is  mandated  to  try  crimes  
found in the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act,  1926,  which  deals  with  oﬀences  relating  to  the  abuse  
of  girls  and  abductions  for  “immoral  purposes  (Nowrojee,  supra note  1,  at  97-‐‑98),  although  no  charges  
have been brought under this statute.
42     Statute  of  the  Special  Court  of  Sierra  Leone,  annexed  to  the  Agreement  Between  the  United  
Nations  and  the  Government  of  Sierra  Leone  on  the  Establishment  of  a  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone,  
United  Nations  and  Sierra  Leone,  16  January  2002,  2178  U.N.T.S.  138,  art.  2(g)  [SC-‐‑SL  Statute].    
43   Ibid.  art.  3(e).  
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cused   on   counts   of   “sexual   slavery   and   any   other   form   of   sexual   violence,”   “other  
inhumane  act,”  and  “outrages  upon  personal  dignity”  in  relation  to  forced  marriages.44
At the Trial Chamber II, the three accused were convicted on the majority of the counts,
but  were  acqui ed  on  the  sexual  slavery  and  other  inhumane  acts  charges.    The  Trial  
Chamber held that any act of forced marriage was entirely subsumed by the sexual
slavery charge, and was thus redundant.45 Furthermore, it ruled that the charge of
sexual  slavery  had  been  improperly  pleaded,  as  the  charge  read  “sexual  slavery  and  
other sexual violations” (which is properly two separate counts), and was thus found
to be duplicitous.46 The evidence relating to these forced marriages was thus consid-‐‑
ered  only  under  the  war  crime  charge  of  “outrages  upon  personal  dignity.”47
The Prosecutor appealed this decision, and the Appeals Chamber accepted the pros-‐‑
ecution’s arguments on the forced marriage charge and ruled that a coerced marital
association can be considered as a separate and distinct crime from that of sexual slav-‐‑
ery,  as  it  is  not  predominantly  a  sexual  crime,  and  the  use  of  the  term  “wife”  signiﬁes  
more  than  the  mere  assertion  of  “ownership”  over  the  victim.48 The Appeals Chamber
deﬁned  forced  marriages  as  follows:  

44   Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu,  “Further  Amended  Consolidated  Indictment  Submi ed  by  
Prosecutor  David  M.  Crane”  (18  February  2005),  Case  No.  SCSL-‐‑2004-‐‑16-‐‑PT,  Special  Court  for  Sierra  
Leone,  Trial  Chamber  II,  20  June  2007  at  paras.  51-‐‑57.  
45   Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case  No.  SCSL-‐‑04-‐‑16-‐‑T,  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone,  
Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 20 June 2007at para. 711 [Brima I].
46   Ibid. at  paras.  92-‐‑95.
47   See Doherty Dissent, supra note  14.  Justice  Doherty  dissented  on  count  7  (sexual  slavery)  and  
count 8 (forced marriages). She held that the majority’s approach to count 7 was overly formalistic (at
para. 2). She would not have dismissed the charge of sexual slavery in its entirety, but rather would
only have considered evidence relating to sexual slavery, not sexual violence (at para. 12). Regarding
forced marriages, Justice Doherty considered the evidence of the Prosecution’s expert witness, Mrs.
Zanaib  Bangura,  and  held  that  forced  marriages  could  constitute  a  crime  against  humanity.  The  ex-‐‑
pert witness had interviewed women and girls who had been married to combatants and found that
all  of  them  had  been  abducted;  that  neither  their  consent  nor  that  of  their  families  was  obtained  (at  
para.  27);  that  these  women  and  girls  “belonged”  to  one  person  in  an  exclusive  relationship  (at  para.  
29);  that  forced  marriage  was  a  means  of  survival  (at  para.  29);  that  many  of  them  became  pregnant  
and  were  forced  to  give  birth,  although  miscarriages  and  sexually  transmi ed  diseases  were  com-‐‑
mon  (at  para.  30);  that  they  were  expected  to  gratify  their  husbands  sexually  upon  demand  and  were  
forced  to  carry  out  a  variety  of  domestic  tasks  (at  para.  31);  that  they  were  further  expected  to  show  
“undying  loyalty  to  her  husband  to  reward  him  with  ‘love’  and  aﬀection”  and  that  punishment  for  
“disloyalty”  was  severe  (at  para.  32);  and  that  many  faced  long-‐‑term  stigmatization  upon  their  return  
to  their  communities,  due  to  the  “widespread  belief  that  any  person  who  lives  with  a  rebel  leader  for  
more  than  a  day  becomes  tainted  and  acquires  ‘rebel  behaviour’”  (at  para.  33);  and  that  many  of  the  
former  “wives”  remained  with  their  rebel  “husbands”  (at  para.  33).  Considering  this  evidence,  Justice  
Doherty  argued  that  the  “use  of  the  term  ‘wife’  is  indicative  of  forced  marital  status  which  has  lasting  
and serious impacts on the victim … [and] would therefore have held the actus reus and mens rea of
an  Other  Inhumane  Act,  forced  marriage,  are  satisﬁed”  (at  para.  51).  The  evidence  presented  by  the  
Prosecution’s  expert  mirrors,  in  many  ways,  the  stories  of  the  “wives”  in  Sierra  Leone  seen  above.  The  
diﬀerence,  however,  is  that  there  is  no  discussion  of  any  combat  role  on  the  part  of  the  “wives”  and  
also    a  less  nuanced  discussion  of  the  complexities  of  the  various  relationships  between  “wives”  and  
“husbands”  and  between  the  women  and  girls  within  the  camps.  
48   Brima II, supra note 5 at para. 195.
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a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or those
of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force,
threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in severe
suﬀering,  or  physical,  mental  or  psychological  injury  to  the  victim.49
Importantly,  the  Appeals  Chamber  also  held  that  there  is  a  “clear  and  convincing  dis-‐‑
tinction”  between  forced  marriages  during  armed  conﬂict  and  the  practice  of  arranged  
marriages among certain communities during peacetime:
While traditionally arranged marriages involving minors violate certain interna-‐‑
tional human rights norms such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), forced marriages which involve the abduc-‐‑
tion and detention of women and girls and their use for sexual and other purposes is
clearly criminal in nature.50
The Appeals Chamber further held that the prohibition of other inhumane acts in in-‐‑
ternational  law  is  intended  to  serve  as  a  residual  category,  “so  as  to  punish  criminal  
acts  not  speciﬁcally  recognised  as  crimes  against  humanity,  but  which,  in  context,  are  
of comparable gravity to the listed crimes against humanity,”51 and is not intended
to  “foreclose  the  possibility  of  charging  as  ‘Other  Inhumane  Acts’  crimes  which  may  
[…] have a sexual or gender component.”52    Taking  into  account  the  “atmosphere  of  
violence”  and  the  “vulnerability  of  the  women  and  girls”  and  the  “eﬀect  of  the  perpe-‐‑
trator’s conduct on the physical, moral and psychological health of the victims,” the
Appeals Chamber held that forced marriage is of a similar gravity to the enumerated
crimes against humanity,53 and that due to the systematic nature of the abductions and
the  “prevailing  atmosphere  of  coercion  and  intimidation,”  the  perpetrators  could  not  
have   “been   under   any   illusion   that   their   conduct   was   not   criminal.”54 The Appeals
Chamber thus found that forced marriage is criminal in nature and can give rise to
individual  criminal  responsibility  in  international  law,  as  it  constitutes  an  “other  inhu-‐‑
mane act.” The Appeals Chamber declined, however, to enter a cumulative conviction,
alongside  “outrages  upon  personal  dignity,”  because  it  felt  that  “society’s  disapproval”  
of  this  particular  act  was  adequately  reﬂected  by  the  recognition  alone  that  forced  mar-‐‑
riage is criminal in nature.55

49  
50
51
52
53  
54
55

Ibid. at  para.  196.  
Brima II, supra  note  5  at  para.  94.  
Ibid. at  para.  183.
Ibid. at  FN  284.
Ibid. at para. 200.
Ibid. at para. 201.
Brima II, supra note 5 at para. 202.
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III. THE CONSTITUENT CRIMES THAT UNDERPIN THE CRIME OF FORCED
MARRIAGE
Before   entering   into   a   discussion   of   the   signiﬁcance   of   the Brima II judgment in its
recognition of forced marriage as a separate crime, it is important to examine the con-‐‑
stituent elements of forced marriage to ensure that the introduction of this new crime
in IHL is not redundant or unnecessary. As the Appeals Chamber itself recognized,
tribunals must be careful to ensure that the category of Other Inhumane Acts is not
made  “too  embracing  as  to  make  it  a  surplusage  of  what  has  been  expressly  provided  
for.”56 While this paper ultimately argues that the ideal approach to addressing the
phenomenon  of  forced  marriages  in  armed  conﬂict  situations  is  to  name  it  as  a  separate  
and  distinct  crime,  as  this  is  the  best  means  by  which  to  “provide  the  women  who  lived  
through   the   experience   [with]   a   direct   international   acknowledgment   of   the   acts   to  
which they were subjected,”57  if  the  violations  that  occur  under  the  guise  of  the  “mar-‐‑
riage” can be adequately punished under existing international law then the formula-‐‑
tion  of  a  new  category  of  international  crime  would  be  superﬂuous.58 Furthermore,
an exploration of alternative charging options is essential if other international or do-‐‑
mestic  tribunals  decline  to  follow  the  precedent  set  by  the  SC-‐‑SL.    To  this  end,  possible  
charges of enslavement and sexual slavery, sexual violence, and the recruitment of
child soldiers are examined in turn.

1. Enslavement and Sexual Slavery
It is clear that forced marriage shares many of the elements of the recognized crimes of
both enslavement and sexual slavery.59 For the purposes of this section, sexual slavery
is  deﬁned  as  a  speciﬁc  form  of  the  general  crime  of  enslavement  and  thus  the  discus-‐‑
sion  of  the  former  should  be  viewed  as  encompassing  the  la er.60 The Trial Chamber
II in Brima I  ruled  that  sexual  slavery  consists  of  “the  perpetrators  exercising  any  or  all  
of  the  powers  a aching  to  the  right  of  ownership  over  one  or  more  persons  by  impos-‐‑
ing on them a deprivation of liberty, and causing them to engage in one or more acts
of a sexual nature.”61    The  Trial  Chamber  II  further  held  that  the  use  of  the  term  “wife”  

56   Ibid. at para. 185.
57    Monika  Satya  Kalra,  “Forced  Marriage:  Rwanda’s  Secret  Revealed”  (2001)  7  U.C.  Davis  J.  Int’l  L.  
&  Pol’y  197  at  203.  
58    See  Scharf  &  Ma ler,  supra  note  40  at  15.  
59    Sexual  slavery  is  included  in  the  SC-‐‑SL  Statute,  supra note  42  at  art.  2(g).
60     Askin, supra note  39  at  136,  argues  that  “in  sexual  slavery,  the  adjective  ‘sexual’  should  be  indica-‐‑
tive of the form or nature of the slavery, although not necessarily the exclusive or dominant form or
nature.”  “Enslavement”  and  “Sexual  Slavery”  are  considered  to  be  separate  crimes  against  humanity  
under  art.  2(c)  and  2(g)  of  the  SC-‐‑SL  Statute,  supra  note  42;  and  under  art.  7(1)(c)  and  art.  7(1)(g)  of  
the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  (17  July  1998),  U.N.  Doc.  A/Conf.  183/9  [Rome  
Statute].
61   Brima I, supra note  45  at  para.  708.  
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signiﬁed  intent  to  exercise  ownership  rights  over  the  victim.62
Sexual  slavery  was  ﬁrst  codiﬁed  as  an  international  crime  against  humanity  and  a  war  
crime when it was included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC),  although  many  argued  that  this  was  merely  a  clariﬁcation  of  the  existence  of  
a particular form of slavery under customary international law.63      The   deﬁnition   of  
sexual  slavery  adopted  by  the  Trial  Chamber  II  echoes  the  deﬁnition  of  the  crime  as  it  
is described in the Rome Statute, and elucidated in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes:
The  perpetrator  exercised  any  or  all  of  the  powers  a aching  to  the  right  
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling,
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them
a similar deprivation of liberty [and the] perpetrator caused such person
or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature […]. It is
understood that such deprivations of liberty may […] include exacting
forced  labour  or  otherwise  reducing  a  person  to  a  servile  status  as  deﬁned  
in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade,   and   Institutions   and   Practices   Similar   to   Slavery   of   1956   [Slavery
Convention].64
Oosterveld  has  noted  that  the  reference  to  the  1956  Slavery Convention includes in its
deﬁnitions  of  servitude  “any  institution  or  practice  whereby  […]  a  woman,  without  
the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage for payment or a consideration in
money  or  in  kind  to  her  parents,  guardian,  family  or  any  other  person  or  group.”65 The
crime of sexual slavery under international law is thus one in which the perpetrator
denies the victim his or her individual autonomy through sexual means.66    This  deﬁni-‐‑
tion is clearly broad enough to include the incidents of forced marriage, particularly
as marriage without consent is considered as a form of servitude under the Slavery
Convention.
Moreover, various authors and reports have considered that forced marriage consti-‐‑
tutes a form of sexual slavery or enslavement. McDougall, the Special Rapporteur on
systematic  rape,  sexual  slavery  and  slavery-‐‑like  practices  during  armed  conﬂict,  dis-‐‑
cussing the phenomenon of forced marriages within Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA),  argued  that  “the  repeated  rape  and  sexual  abuse  of  women  and  girls  under  the  
62   It should be noted that even Justice Doherty, who claimed that forced marriages should be
recognized  as  a  separate  crime  used  the  term  “ownership”  in  referring  to  forced  marriages:  “some  
girls  and  women  forced  into  marriage  beneﬁted  from  their  ‘marriage’  insofar  as  their  ownership by a
particular  rebel  may  have  oﬀered  them  some  protection  from  rape  and  other  forms  of  abuse  by  the  
other rebels” (See Doherty Dissent, supra  note  14  at  para.  46)  [emphasis  added].
63     Valerie  Oosterveld,  “Sexual  Slavery  and  the  International  Criminal  Court:  Advancing  
International  Law”  (2003-‐‑2004)  25  Mich.  J.  Int’l  L.  605  at  607.
64   International Criminal Court, Elements of Crime,  U.N.Doc  PCNICC/2000/1  Add.2  (2000),  referenc-‐‑
ing  art.  7  (1)(g)  and  art.  8(2)(b)(xxii),  including  FN  17  and  FN  53.  
65   Oosterveld, supra  note  63  at  634.  
66   Ibid. at  650.
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guise of marriage constitutes slavery, as the victims do not have the freedom to leave,
to refuse the sham marriage, or to decide whether and on what terms to engage in
sexual activity.”67 The TRC, in relation to forced marriages in Sierra Leone, also claims
that  “when  ‘forced  marriage’  involves  forced  sex  or  the  inability  to  control  sexual  ac-‐‑
cess  or  exercise  sexual  autonomy,  which,  by  deﬁnition,  forced  marriage  almost  always  
does, it constitutes sexual slavery.”68
There is also strong international jurisprudential support for the claim that forced mar-‐‑
riages could constitute a particular form of sexual slavery. The Trial Chamber of the
ICTY,   in   its   2002   Prosecutor v. Kunarac69 judgment, found that the three accused, all
members  of  the  Serbian  military,  who  had  taken  women  and  girls  from  detention  cen-‐‑
tres  in  the  town  of  Foča  during  the  war  and  held  them  for  their  own  personal  sexual  
gratiﬁcation  and  forced  them  to  cook  and  clean  during  the  day,  were  guilty  of  rape  and  
enslavement as crimes against humanity.70    The  ICTY  also  provided  a  list  of  indicia  for  
the crime of enslavement:
control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment,
psychological   control,   measures   taken   to   prevent   or   deter   escape,   force,  
threat or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.71
As   Bélair   notes,   these   elements   of   sexual   slavery   were   clearly   present   in   the   Sierra  
Leonean context:
The   wives   although   not   chained   or   conﬁned   were   captives.      The   rebels  
took  deliberate measures to prevent them from escaping: they threatened
the  women  with  death  if  they  tried  to  ﬂee,  carved  the  faction’s  initials  onto  
their chests, and exercised pernicious psychological control over them by
making  them  fear  that  their  families  would  ostracize  them.72

67     UN  ESC,  Sub-‐‑Commission  on  the  Promotion  and  Protection  of  Human  Rights, Contemporary
Forms  of  Slavery,  Systematic  Rape,  Sexual  Slavery  and  Slavery-‐‑like  Practices  During  Armed  Conﬂict:  
Update  to  the  Final  Report  Submi ed  by  Ms.  Gay  J.  McDougall,  Special  Rapporteur, 52nd  Sess.,  E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2000/21  (6  June  2000)  at  para.  13.  
68   TRC, supra  note  18  at  para.  184.  
69   Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, Case  No.  IT-‐‑96-‐‑23&IT-‐‑96-‐‑23/1-‐‑A,  International  Criminal  
Tribunal  for  the  Former  Yugoslavia,  Judgment,  Trial  Chamber,  12  June  2002  [Kunarac].
70    Gardam  &  Jarvis,  supra note  4  at  199.  The  separate  charges  of  rape  and  enslavement  were  neces-‐‑
sary,  as  the  ICTY  Statute  does  not  speciﬁcally  enumerate  “sexual  slavery”  as  a  crime,  as  do  the  SC-‐‑SL  
Statute and the Rome Statute.
71 Kunarac, supra  note  69  at  para.  543.  
72    Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  563.  The  Special  Rapporteur,  Gay  J.  McDougall,  in Contemporary Forms of
Slavery:  Systematic  Rape,  Sexual  Slavery,  and  Slavery-‐‑like  Practices  During  Armed  Conﬂict:  Final  Report,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13  (22  June  1998)  at  para.  29,  has  further  noted  that  limitations  on  autonomy  must  
be  analyzed  in  a  gender-‐‑conscious  way  and  that  “the  mere  ability  to  extricate  oneself  at  substantial  
risk  of  personal  harm  from  a  condition  of  slavery  should  not  be  interpreted  as  nullifying  a  claim  of  
slavery.”
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Furthermore,   the   forced   domestic   labour   performed   by   the   “wives”   in   Sierra   Leone  
serves as an additional indication of a situation of slavery, as does the use of force by
the  “husbands”  and  the  incidents  of  physical  and  sexual  abuse  that  were  so  apparent  
in the stories of the women and girls above.73
While forced marriage could certainly be prosecuted as either enslavement or sexual
slavery, or both, it should be noted that neither charge fully captures the true nature of
the  speciﬁc  violation  suﬀered  by  the  “wives”  in  forced  marriages.    Similarly  to  the  way  
in  which  the  dra ers  of  both  the  Rome  Statute  and  the  SC-‐‑SL  Statute  recognized  that  
“sexual  slavery  is  more  than  slavery  and  more  than  rape,  [as]  the  victim  of  sexual  slav-‐‑
ery  suﬀers  diﬀerently  from  the  victims  of  other  crimes  against  humanity,”74 it should
be recognized that the victims of forced marriages are prejudiced in unique ways that
are not fully encapsulated within the existing listed crimes against humanity or war
crimes.    The  distinction  resides  in  the  fact  that  the  degree  of  “ownership”  exercised  
over women in forced marriages is of a particularly pernicious nature in that it is dis-‐‑
guised  within  the  legitimate  institution  of  marriage.    The  “pseudo-‐‑familial  form”  of  the  
enslavement  and  the  intentional  use  of  the  labels  of  “husband”  and  “wife”  to  “obscure  
the stigma of rape” and other violations done to the women and girls75 has particular
emotional, psychological, and social repercussions for the victims of forced marriage
that are not necessarily present, to the same extent, under situations of enslavement,
or even of sexual enslavement. This view is supported by the Prosecution’s expert wit-‐‑
ness  Mrs.  Zainab  Bangura’s  testimony  in  the  Brima II judgment:
The use of the term ‘wife’ by the perpetrator was deliberate and strategic.
The word ‘wife’ demonstrated a rebel’s control over a woman. His
psychological manipulation of her feelings rendered her unable to deny
him   his   wishes.      By   calling   a   woman   his   ‘wife’,   the   man   or   ‘husband’  
openly   staked   his   claim   and   she   was   not   allowed   to   have   sex   with   any  
other person. 76
The  added  element  of  “forced  intimacy”  and  the  exclusive  nature  of  the  relationship  
imposed   upon   the   “wives”   both   have   particular   long-‐‑term   and   stigmatizing   conse-‐‑
quences that should be recognized.77

73     See  Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  564.  Cecilia  M.  Bailliet,  “Examining  Sexual  Violence  in  the  Military  
Within  the  Context  of  Eritrean  Asylum  Claims  Presented  in  Norway”  (2007)  19:3  Int’l  J.  Refugee  L.  
471  at  483,  has  also  argued  that  Eritrean  female  recruits  could  be  viewed  as  “slaves”  in  that  “similar  
to  the  ICTY  Kunarac case, they described being forced to perform domestic duties, including washing
clothes,  cooking  and  preparing  coﬀee,  in  addition  to  continuous  sexual  violation,  thereby  signaling  a  
possible case of enslavement.”
74     Scharf  &  Ma ler,  supra  note  40  at  16.
75    Bailliet,  supra  note  73  at  483.  
76   Brima II, supra note 5 at 192.
77 See Kalra, supra note  57  at  215;  Askin,  supra  note  39  at  149.  
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2. Sexual Violence: Forced Pregnancies to Rape
It  would  also  be  possible  for  prosecutions  of  forced  marriages  to  focus  on  the  speciﬁc  
acts  of  sexual  violence  to  which  “wives”  are  subjected  over  the  course  of  their  “mar-‐‑
riages.” Many authors writing prior to the release of the Brima II judgment, in fact, ar-‐‑
gued  that  the  sexual  nature  of  the  crime,  particularly  the  prolonged  rape  of  the  “wives”  
by  their  “husbands,”  should  be  the  starting  point  for  classifying  forced  marriages  as  
crimes  against  humanity  or  war  crimes.    Kalra,  for  example,  suggests  that  “the  very  
nature of marriage has sexual connotations, and the intimacy of such a relationship
clearly falls within the requirement that a crime be of a sexual nature.”78 Furthermore,
the  speciﬁc  inclusion  of  rape,  forced  pregnancy,  and  any  other  form  of  sexual  violence  
in  both  the  SC-‐‑SL  Statute  and  the  Rome  Statute79 suggests that the separate charging
of  the  various  sexual  components  of  forced  marriages  could  be  an  eﬀective  and  simple  
prosecutorial strategy.
It  is  evident  that  “husbands”  who  abduct  their  “wives”  and  subject  them  to  non-‐‑con-‐‑
sensual  sex  could  be  charged  with  the  speciﬁc  crime  of  rape.    As  certain  authors  have  
noted,  “the  manifestly  coercive  circumstances  that  exist  in  all  armed  conﬂict  situations  
establish  a  presumption  of  non-‐‑consent”  to  sexual  activity,80 thus suggesting that the
abduction  of  the  women  and  girls  prior  to  their  being  labeled  as  “wives”  indicates  a  
clear  instance  of  rape  where  they  are  a erwards  forced  to  engage  in  sexual  relations  
with  their  “husbands.”        
It  is  also  clear  that  forced  marriages  could  fall  under  the  umbrella  term  of  “sexual  vio-‐‑
lence.”    Indeed,  the  Trial  Chamber  of  the  ICTY  in  Prosecutor  v.  Kvočka  held  that  “sexual  
violence is broader than rape,” and listed sexual molestation, forced marriage, and
forced  abortion  as  examples  of  other  gender-‐‑related  crimes  that  should  be  prosecut-‐‑
able as such.81    The  advantage  of  bringing  a  charge  of  “sexual  violence”  in  relation  to  
forced marriages, rather than one of rape, is that it enables a broader and more nuanced
reading  of  the  harms  suﬀered  by  the  “wives”  within  their  “marriages,”  as  sexual  vio-‐‑
lence  has  been  deﬁned  as  “any  violence,  physical  or  psychological,  carried  out  through  
sexual means or by targeting sexuality,”82   and   as   “any   act   of   a   sexual   nature   which  
is  commi ed  against  a  person  under  circumstances  which  are  coercive.”83    Based  on  
similar considerations of physical or psychological violence, forced marriages could
78 Kalra, supra note 57 at 209.
79    SC-‐‑SL  Statute,  supra  note  42  at  art.  2(g),  and  also  art.  3(e),  which  lists  “Outrages  upon  personal  
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form
of indecent assault.” This same language is found in the Rome Statute, supra  note  60,  at  art.  7(1)(g)  -‐‑-‐‑  
with  the  distinction  that  “other  sexual  violence”  is  qualiﬁed  by  “of  comparable  gravity”  -‐‑-‐‑  and  at  art.  
8(2)(b)(xxii).
80 McDougall, supra note 72 at para. 25.
81 Prosecutor  v.  Kvočka,  et  al.,  IT-‐‑98-‐‑30/1-‐‑T,  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former  
Yugoslavia,  Judgment,  Trial  Chamber,  2  November  2001,  at  para.  180.  
82 McDougall, supra note 72 at para. 21.
83   Prosecutor v. Akayesu,  Case  No.  ICTR-‐‑96-‐‑4-‐‑T,  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  Rwanda,  
Judgment,  2  September  1998,  at  para.  688
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also  be  prosecuted  as  war  crimes,  either  under  the  heading  of  “violence  to  life,  health  
and  physical  or  mental  well-‐‑being  of  persons,”  or  “outrages  upon  personal  dignity,”84
as forced marriages invariably involved either actual force, or the threat of force, and
clearly  included  instances  of  “violence”  and/or  a  serious  aﬀront  to  “dignity.”85
Lastly, charges relating to the elimination of the wives’ reproductive freedom could
also  be  brought  against  “husbands”  who  either  forced  their  “wives”  to  remain  preg-‐‑
nant or who actively induced abortions, as there was evidence of both practices in
Sierra  Leone.    Under  the  Rome  Statute,  forced  pregnancy  is  deﬁned  as  “the  unlawful  
conﬁnement  of  a  woman  forcibly  made  pregnant,  with  the  intent  of  aﬀecting  the  ethnic  
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law.”86    Askin  argues  that  rape,  resulting  in  pregnancy,  could  plausibly  give  rise  to  a  
charge   of   forced   pregnancy,   as   “the   victimiser   merely   needs   to   intend   to   engage   in  
the conduct, the sexual activity, not intend the pregnancy,” as pregnancy is clearly
a foreseeable consequence of sex.87 She also argues that a woman can still be con-‐‑
sidered  as  a  victim  of  forced  pregnancy  even  if  she  “bears,  keeps  and  loves  the  child  
borne of rape.”88 It could also be possible to prosecute forced abortions, as crimes of
“sexual  violence”,  “other  inhumane  acts,”  or  “outrages  upon  personal  dignity,”  where  
a woman loses her pregnancy against her will in violation of international law, such
as where physical abuse or sexual violence results in a miscarriage, and where the
“pregnancy  was  known  or  obvious  and  the  miscarriage  is  a  foreseeable  outcome  of  the  
violence.”89
While  bringing  separate  charges  related  to  the  sexual  crimes  commi ed  under  the  ve-‐‑
neer of the forced marriage is certainly a viable prosecutorial strategy, this approach
is   inadequate   in   that   it   does   not   suﬃce   in   capturing   the   highly   gendered   nature   of  
the crime of forced marriage, an argument that will be further explored below in Part
IV.      The   exclusive   focus   on   the   sexual   nature   of   the   crime   masks   the   fact   that   these  
women  and  girls  are  being  forced  to  perform  “wifely”  duties,  constructed  on  the  basis  
of highly rigid and discriminatory gender roles and stereotypes, and which include
many elements, such as domestic labour, that cannot be directly equated with sexual
violence.      Furthermore,   as   expressed   in   the   stories   of   some   of   the   “wives”   in   Sierra  
Leone, not all of them were subjected to sexual violence, suggesting that this piecemeal
approach to criminalizing forced marriage will not adequately protect the rights of the
women  and  girls  themselves,  nor  eﬀectively  stigmatize  the  true  nature  of  the  violence  
done to them.

84     SC-‐‑SL  Statute,  supra  note  42,  arts.  3(a),  3(e);  Rome  Statute,  supra  note  60,  arts.  8(2)(b)(xxi)  and  
8(2)(c)(i).
85 Kalra, supra note 57 at 219.
86   Rome Statute, supra  note  60,  art.  7(2)(f).  
87    Askin,  supra  note  39  at  144.  
88 Ibid.  at  144.  
89    Askin,  supra  note  39  at  151.  
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3. Recruitment of Child Soldiers
Another constituent element of forced marriages in Sierra Leone, in some although
not all cases, is the forced recruitment of women and girls into the military structure
of the rebel groups that abducted them. While an exploration of the treatment of child
soldiers under IHL, and the gaps that exist in terms of their protection within this sys-‐‑
tem90  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  “wives”  of  Sierra  
Leone were not merely victims, but also active combatants in certain instances, an as-‐‑
pect of their experience that is generally ignored in legal argument and writing. This
section of the paper aims to explore the feasibility of regulating forced marriages by
focusing  on  the  issue  of  “child  soldiers”  rather  than  on  the  sexual  or  gendered  nature  
of the phenomenon of forced marriage, an issue that is particularly relevant in the
context  of  Sierra  Leone,  as  the  SC-‐‑SL  is  speciﬁcally  mandated  to  address  crimes  com-‐‑
mi ed  against  child  soldiers  as  “other  serious  violations  of  international  humanitarian  
law.”91
There  is  a  plausible  argument  that  the  absence  of  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  “wives”  
in participating in active combat is related to the desire to recognize the victimization
of these girls and to ensure that they are protected, rather than prosecuted. However,
neatly  slo ing  these  wife-‐‑soldiers  into  the  category  of  “victim”  does  not  necessarily  
give voice to their true experiences and might actually do them a disservice, in the
sense  that  it  may  make  reintegration  into  their  communities  more  diﬃcult.92 Without
a recognition of the ways in which forced marriage is an integral part of many armed
groups’  recruitment  and  war-‐‑waging  strategies  and  operations,  these  “wives”  may  get  
lost  in  the  shuﬄe  and  become  doubly  victimized:  ﬁrst  by  their  abductors/“husbands,”  
90    See  Sarah  Wells,  “Crimes  Against  Child  Soldiers  in  Armed  Conﬂict  Situations:  Application  and  
Limits  of  International  Humanitarian  Law”  (2004)  12  Tul.  J.  Int’l  &  Comp.  L.  287,  for  an  insightful  
examination  of  the  lacuna  that  exists  in  regard  to  the  protections  oﬀered  to  child  soldiers  within  inter-‐‑
national  humanitarian  law  due  to  the  “dated  distinctions  between  persons  involved  in  hostilities  and  
persons  needing  protection  from  the  eﬀects  of  hostilities”  (ibid. at 288).
91    SC-‐‑SL  Statute,  supra  note  42,  art.  4(c)  states  that  the  SC-‐‑SL  has  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  the  
“Conscripting  or  enlisting  of  children  under  the  age  of  15  years  into  armed  forces  or  groups  or  using  
them to participate actively in hostilities.” This exact language is also found in the Rome Statute,
supra  note  60,  art.  8(2)(e)(vii)  for  non-‐‑international  conﬂicts,  and  in  Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of  August 949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conﬂicts  (Protocol  II),  8  June  1977,  at  art.  4(3)(c)  as  well.  
92 Wells, supra  note  90  at  para.  305,  for  example,  argues  that  recognizing  the  direct  role  that  some  
children  play  in  armed  conﬂicts  “may  more  eﬀectively  contribute  to  the  public’s  understanding  of  the  
conditions  under  which  children  become  killers,  fostering  its  contribution  to  reconciliation  and  the  
reintegration  of  child  soldiers  in  the  post-‐‑conﬂict  period.”  Park,  supra  note  10  at  323,  further  argues  
that  a  failure  to  recognize  the  role  that  girls,  including  “wives,”  play  in  combat  groups  aﬀects  their  
treatment  post-‐‑conﬂict:  “Disarmament,  demobilization  and  reintegration  (DDR)  programmes  largely  
ignore the needs of girls […]. In Sierra Leone, the ‘cash for weapons’ programme disadvantaged girls
who  did  not  possess  their  own  weapons,  whose  commanders  conﬁscated  their  weapons,  or  who  did  
not serve in a capacity involving arms. Programmes are also not adequately sensitive to girls’ experi-‐‑
ence  with  sexual  violence,  their  needs  as  mothers,  or  their  relationships  to  their  captor-‐‑‘husbands’  
and their home communities […]. DDR programmes routinely underestimate the number of girls
involved  with  ﬁghting  forces,  and  o en  do  not  see  women  and  girls  as  ‘real  soldiers’,  preferring  to  
focus on male soldiers.”
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and second by an international community that refuses to recognize the duality of
their  roles  and  the  agency  that  they  exercised  in  their  combatant  roles.    Park,  for  ex-‐‑
ample,  argues  that  “[s]implistic  representations  of  boys  always  carrying  AK-‐‑47s  and  
of girls as exclusively sexual victims obfuscate the range of children’s experiences.”93
Without  addressing  this  element  of  the  crime  of  forced  marriage,  any  deterrent  eﬀect  
that  the  naming  of  forced  marriage  may  have  on  future  conduct  during  armed  conﬂict  
will remain incomplete and inadequate.
With these considerations in mind, it is possible to argue that focusing on the stigma-‐‑
tization  and  the  criminalization  of  the  use  of  child  soldiers  may  be  an  eﬀective,  or  at  
least  feasible,  way  of  addressing  the  issue  of  forced  marriages  during  conﬂict  situa-‐‑
tions. First, if the aim of IHL is to protect to the fullest extent possible all victims of
war, then the most desirable way of achieving this is to address the conditions that
enable the waging and prolonging of warfare. To this end, the abduction of girls into
forced marriage could be viewed as a form of perverse military recruitment into armed
groups   that   struggle   to   a ract   ﬁghters   to   their   cause,   and   one   that   serves   to   sustain  
armed  conﬂict.94    In  support  of  this  thesis,  authors  have  noted  that  the  “exploitation  of  
girls’  domestic  labour  was  fundamental  to  the  continuation  of  ﬁghting  as  it  sustained  
the armed group”95  and  that  “the  kinds  of  tasks  and  roles  girl  soldiers  are  allo ed  and  
in  some  cases  forced  to  undertake  are  part  of  a  larger  planning  process  deliberately  
created  by  those  looking  to  sustain  and  gain  from  the  armed  conﬂict.”96 Furthermore,
forced marriage itself is, at times, an inherent part of the rebels’ organizational struc-‐‑
ture, as was the case in Uganda with the LRA, and arguably in Sierra Leone with the
various armed factions:
The testimony of children describes a strictly hierarchical structure within
the   LRA   founded   on   a   macabre   re-‐‑ordering   of   experiences   familiar   to  
children.    The  bedrock  of  internal  organization  is  what  the  children  describe  
as the ‘family’. This relies, in the end, on the abduction of girls for forced
marriage  -‐‑-‐‑  without  forced  marriage  the  ‘families’  would  not  exist.97
It could be argued, therefore, that the best means of preventing forced marriages dur-‐‑
ing  armed  conﬂicts  is  to  increase  the  protections  oﬀered  to  children  within  IHL  and  to  
vigorously stigmatize and prosecute their use as child soldiers, as this may address the
root cause of why girls are being abducted into forced marriages.98    The  UNICEF  deﬁ-‐‑
93     Park,  supra  note  10  at  321.  
94     McKay  &  Mazurana,  supra  note  31  at  28.  
95    Park,  supra  note  10  at  324.  
96     McKay  &  Mazurana,  supra  note  31  at  109.  
97    Amnesty  International,  “‘Breaking  God’s  Commands’:  the  Destruction  of  Childhood  by  the  
Lord’s  Resistance  Army”  (1997),  online:  Amnesty  International  <h p://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AFR59/001/1997/en/dom-‐‑AFR590011997en.html>  at  15.  
98    McKay  &  Mazurana,  supra  note  31  at  120  argue,  for  example,  that  focusing  on  the  role  that  girls  
play  in  combat  forces,  and  an  assessment  of  gender  as  a  key  factor,  may  lead  to,  a  “deeper  under-‐‑
standing  of  what  it  takes  to  create  and  maintain  the  kinds  of  ﬁghting  forces  and  armed  conﬂicts  we  
are now seeing.”
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nition  of  “child  soldier,”  as  set  out  in  the  Cape Town Principles,  oﬀers  a  way  forward  in  
this  regard,  through  its  recognition  that  a  child  soldier  is  “any  person  under  18  years  of  
age  who  is  part  of  any  kind  of  regular  or  irregular  armed  force  or  armed  group  in any
capacity.”99    As  Park  notes,  “this  capacious  deﬁnition”  includes  those  children  who  act  
in  a  “support  capacity”  or  “who  are  recruited  for  the  purpose  of  marriage,  or  to  render  
sexual services.”100 Adopting this expansive view of child soldiers would allow the
prosecution  of  forced  marriages  to  be  carried  out  as  part  of  an  a empt  to  eradicate  the  
use  of  under-‐‑age  combatants  and  thus  reduce  the  capacity  of  armed  groups  to  sustain  
their  war  eﬀorts.  
The problem with pursuing this avenue for addressing the issue of forced marriages
is  that  not  all  “wives”  abducted  into  ﬁghting  forces  would  be  deemed  to  be  child  sol-‐‑
diers   under   international   law,   and   thus   would   not   be   oﬀered   protection   or   redress.    
Moreover, while the child soldier approach is advantageous in the sense that it does
not  unduly  stereotype  women  and  girls  as  mere  “super-‐‑victims,”  and  allows  an  ex-‐‑
amination  of  speciﬁc  vulnerabilities  based  on  age,  it  is  inadequate  in  that  it  does  not  
speciﬁcally   address   the   gendered   violence   that   underpins   forced   marriages.      Just   as  
ignoring   the   combat   role   of   “wives”   obscures   the   complexities   of   their   experiences  
within forced marriages, so would ignoring the other components of their lives with
their  “husbands,”  including  sexual  and  gender  violence.    I  argue,  therefore,  that  the  
“recruitment   and   enlistment   of   child   soldiers”   should   be   charged   alongside   forced  
marriage as a violation of IHL, as the former category does not fully address the true
nature of forced marriages, but can add depth and breadth to the international comni-‐‑
ty’s understandings of both phenomena.101

4. More Than a Sum of Its Parts
In   conclusion,   while   the   examination   of   the   above-‐‑explored   constituent   elements   of  
forced   marriage   highlights   the   egregious   nature   of   the   acts   that   are   o en   contained  
within  the  “marriage,”  it  also  provides  evidence  that  prosecuting  the  component  parts  
does not serve to adequately address the institutionalization of all of these various
violations under the guise of a legitimate social relationship. The ongoing abuse suf-‐‑
99    “Deﬁnitions”,  Cape  Town  Principles  and  Best  Practices  on  the  Recruitment  of  Children  into  
Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers (UNICEF, 1997)
[Cape Town Principles].
100    Park,  supra  note  10  at  319.  The  deﬁnition  of  “child  soldier”  in  the  Cape  Town  Principles  explicitly  
recognizes  that  forced  marriage  is  a  form  of  “recruitment”:  “The  deﬁnition  includes  girls  recruited  for  
sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying
or has carried arms.” (Cape Town Principles, ibid.)
101 The courts in Brima I and II,  which  were  the  ﬁrst  international  tribunals  to  prosecute  the  crime  of  
the recruitment of child soldiers under international law, failed to draw any connection between the
forced  marriages  and  the  war  eﬀort,  despite  evidence  on  record  that  supported  this  association  (see  
Brima I, supra  note  45  at  para.  1260)  and  despite  noting  that  “any  labour  or  support  given  to  the  war  
that  gives  eﬀect  to,  or  helps  maintain,  operations  in  a  conﬂict  constitutes  active  participation”  (ibid.
at  1266,  referring  to  children  guarding  diamond  minds  as  an  integral  part  of  the  structure  of  the  war  
eﬀort).  Thus  the  rigid  dichotomy  in  IHL  regarding  its  treatment  of  civilians  and  combatants  remains  
intact,  despite  the  presence  of  these  “wives”/soldiers  who  inherently  challenge  this  paradigm.    
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fered  by  the  women  and  girls,  who  o en  became  dependent  on  their  captors  –  many  
of  whom  killed,  maimed  or  assaulted  the  women’s  families  prior  to  abducting  them  
and  laying  claim  to  them  as  their  “wives”  –  and  the  element  of  forced  intimacy  within  
the relationship, alongside the psychological trauma of being viewed as married to
their  captors,  are  signiﬁcant  violations  that  go  above  and  beyond  the  various  compo-‐‑
nent  parts  and  require  speciﬁc  and  separate  recognition  within  IHL.102 Existing cat-‐‑
egories   of   crimes   may   be   “too   narrow”   to   capture   the   variety   of   violations   that   the  
independent crime of forced marriage could, and should,  encompass;  a  broader  crime  
of  forced  marriage  might  thus  allow  for  more  accurate  identiﬁcation  and  appropriate  
characterization of the nature of the crime.103    As  Bennoune  notes,  “creatively  patching  
together  interpretations  of  texts  to  ﬁnd  space  for  women’s  experience  of  war  may  not  
ultimately be enough.”104 Instead, what is required is recognition of the sexual com-‐‑
ponent of forced marriage with a simultaneous understanding that this alone does not
eﬀectively  capture  the  totality  of  the  crime  of  forced  marriage,  thus  implying  that  this  
unique  crime  must  be  acknowledged  and  prosecuted  as  a  new  and  distinct  category  
under IHL.

IV. THE NEED TO NAME FORCED MARRIAGE AS A SEPARATE CRIME
The preceding sections of this article were aimed at highlighting the various ways in
which  forced  marriage  cannot  be  adequately  addressed  within  the  existing  framework  
of  IHL.    The  section  that  follows  underscores  the  speciﬁc  reasons  why  naming  forced  
marriage as a separate crime is a reasonable and necessary response to the phenom-‐‑
enon.    The  precedent  set  by  the  SC-‐‑SL  Appeals  Chamber  in  Brima II oﬀers  the  inter-‐‑
national community a viable way forward in terms of recognizing and prosecuting
perpetrators  of  forced  marriages,  and  hopefully  of  lessening  some  of  the  speciﬁc  harms  
faced  by  women  and  girls  in  armed  conﬂicts.  

1. Part of a Continuum of the Recognition of Gender Crimes
It is arguable that the regulation of forced marriage under IHL is at once feasible and
desirable  due  to  the  recent  trend  of  recognizing  and  prosecuting  sexual  and  gender-‐‑
based crimes under international law. In some ways, therefore, the naming of forced
marriage as a crime can be viewed as part of a continuum, or the next necessary step
102    See  Scharf  &  Ma ler,  supra  note  40  at  15.  See  also  Kalra,  supra note 57 at 205, who argues that
“diﬀerent  forms  of  assault  cannot  be  weighed  against  each  other  to  measure  trauma;  rather,  they  
must be recognized individually to convey their gravity. The psychological trauma of the ongoing
rape,  torture,  and  emotional  abuse  reinforces  the  need  to  acknowledge  the  gravity  of  the  speciﬁc  act  
of forced marriage.”
103   See Oosterveld, supra  note  63  at  622-‐‑624,  who  makes  a  similar  argument  regarding  the  necessary  
inclusion of the crime of sexual slavery within the Rome Statute to complement the already existing
crime of enforced prostitution.
104     Karima  Bennoune,  “Do  We  Need  New  International  Law  to  Protect  Women  in  Armed  Conﬂict?”  
(2006-‐‑2007)  38  Case  W.  Res.  J.  Int’l  L.  363  at  387.  
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in  the  culmination  of  the  process  of  “gendering”  IHL,  which  notably  began  with  the  
prosecutions of sexual violence before the ad hoc tribunals in both Rwanda and the
Former  Yugoslavia  in  the  1990s,  and  which  has  helped  counter  a  long  history  of  silence  
and invisibility of these crimes within IHL.105 At the same time, however, one of the
pressing reasons that forced marriages need separate recognition under IHL, as inti-‐‑
mated  above,  is  that  they  represent  unique  gender-‐‑based  crimes  that  are  not  eﬀectively  
captured within the context of existing enumerated crimes against women under IHL,
which tend to focus more narrowly on crimes of a sexual nature.106 While gender vio-‐‑
lence,  as  a  category,  encompasses  sexual  violence,  the  reverse  is  not  true;  thus,  in  only  
recognizing and prosecuting sexual crimes, a gap exists in terms of the protection of
women’s  fundamental  rights  and  interests,  which  renders  invisible  some  of  the  speciﬁc  
ways  in  which  women  are  targeted  within  armed  conﬂicts.    Gender  refers  to  the  “so-‐‑
cially constructed roles of men and women in public and private life,”107  and  gender-‐‑
based  violence  is  any  violation  that  is  “perpetrated  against  a  person’s  will,  and  that  
is  based  on  socially-‐‑ascribed  (gender)  diﬀerences.”108 Focusing on gender requires a
more holistic view of what constitutes a violation under IHL, as it requires an analysis
of the ways in which gender is constructed within societies, the implication this has
for  gendered  violence  within  armed  conﬂict,  and  the  reality  of  continued  gender  viola-‐‑
tions,  post-‐‑conﬂict.109 While sexual violence may be (in theory) safely contained within
a  speciﬁc  temporal  framework,  questions  of  gender-‐‑based  violence  mandate  the  adop-‐‑
tion of a wider conceptual lens. While this analysis is far outside the scope of the tra-‐‑
ditional  norms  of  IHL,  this  argument,  by  itself,  is  not  suﬃcient  to  bar  a  re-‐‑formulation  
of  the  role  that  IHL  is  to  play  in  regulating  armed  conﬂicts.    The  reality  is  that  without  
an  incorporation  of  a  gendered  analysis  into  the  IHL  framework,  its  prevention  and  
regulation regime will remain woefully inadequate.
It is clear that forced marriages fall under the category of gender crimes and must
be distinguished from sexual crimes if their true nature is to be recognized and stig-‐‑
105    See  Park,  supra  note  10  at  325-‐‑26  who  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  trajectory  of  the  histori-‐‑
cal treatment of sexual violence within IHL into the present time, culminating with the Women’s
International  War  Crimes  Tribunal’s  symbolic  victory  regarding  the  “comfort  women”  held  as  sexual  
slaves  by  the  Japanese  military  in  WWII,  and  the  explicit  inclusion  of  speciﬁc  sexual  violence  crimes  
as  “crimes  against  humanity”  in  the  Rome  Statute.  
106     Bennoune,  supra  note  103  at  384,  notes  that  “the  focus  of  women’s  IHL  is  seen  to  fall  narrowly  on  
sexual violence and pregnancy, rather than having a sense of the panoply of violence which befalls
women  in  conﬂict.”  See  also  Gardam  &  Jarvis,  supra  note  4  at  94,  who  argue  that  “women  are  valued  
in IHL in terms of their sexual and reproductive aspects of their lives.”
107 Donna Sullivan, Integration of Human Rights into the work of the Special Rapporteur  (New  York,  
UNIFEM,  1996),  as  cited  in  McDougall,  supra  note  72  at  FN  4.
108 Refugees International, Laws Without Justice (Washington: Refugees International, June 2007) at
Endnote  1.  Gender  is  distinguished  from  sex  as  the  la er  is  inherently  rooted  in  biological  diﬀerences  
and  (at  least  presumed)  immutable  characteristics  (Bailliet,  supra  note  73  at  495).  
109 As Dyan E. Mazurana, et al., “Girls  in  Fighting  Forces  and  Groups:  Their  Recruitment,  
Participation,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration”  (2002)  8:2  Peace  and  Conﬂict:  Journal  of  Peace  
Psychology  97  at  98,  argue,  “the  experiences  and  concerns  of  men,  women,  boys,  and  girls  before,  
during,  and  a er  armed  conﬂicts  are  shaped  by  their  gendered  social  roles.  These  roles  are  in  turn  
formed by cultural, social, economic, and political conditions, expectations and obligations within the
family, community and nation.”
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matized.      This   fact   was   acknowledged   by   the   Appeals   Chamber   in   Brima II, which
ruled   that   these   arrangements   “do   not   always   involve   the   victim   being   subjected   to  
non-‐‑consensual  sex  or  even  forced  domestic  labour[;]  forced  marriage  is  not  a  sexual  
crime.”110 While some have argued that forced marriages explicitly target and control
female  sexuality,  by  violating  women’s  sexual  autonomy  speciﬁcally,111 what is being
truly  targeted,  and  appropriated  by  force,  is  women’s  ascribed  social  roles  as  caretak-‐‑
ers, domestic labourers, and sexual beings. As Denov notes, girls who are forcibly
recruited  into  armed  groups,  “tended  to  be  relegated  to  activities  that  reﬂected  tradi-‐‑
tional   gender   roles   including   cooking,   cleaning,   looking   a er   younger   children   and  
serving  men,  thus  in  many  ways  replicating  the  tasks  that  women  and  girls  undertook  
in the broader society.”112    The  speciﬁc  gendered  component  of  this  crime,  and  its  in-‐‑
terplay with social and cultural norms in times of peace, thus renders it more complex
than traditional sexual violence and suggests the need for separate recognition. In
failing to recognize the widespread and systematic gender abuses that occur within,
and  because  of,  forced  marriages,  and  in  potentially  “collapsing  sex  into  gender,”113 the
present IHL regime is not equipped to address the phenomenon of forced marriages.
The naming of forced marriage as a separate and independent crime is thus at once an
acceptable  consequence  of  the  increased  recognition  of  gender  within  the  framework  
of IHL, but also a necessary step in ensuring that true gendered crimes, such as forced
marriage, receive adequate recognition, stigmatization, and criminalization within the
international system.

2. Giving Voice to Women
Another  signiﬁcant  element  of  the  naming  of  forced  marriage  as  an  independent  and  
prosecutable  crime  under  IHL  is  that  the  naming  may  serve  to  eﬀectively  give  voice  to  
the women and girls who are forced into these relationships. Certain scholars, includ-‐‑
ing  Rosalind  Dixon,  have  called  the  need  to  speciﬁcally  name  sexual  and  gender  crimes  
“the  imperative  of  recognition;”114  others  have  termed  it  the  “struggle  for  meaning,”  as  
in  the  victims’  ﬁght  for  recognition  of  the  crime  done  to  them  and  a  consequent  punish-‐‑
ment of the perpetrators.115 Regardless of any formal labels, naming can play a potent
role  in  allowing  women  forced  into  “marriages”  during  armed  conﬂict  to  fully  express  
what has been done to them, but also to understand the implications and natures of
their  “marriages”  as  well.    The  following  statement  from  a  child  protection  worker  ac-‐‑
110 Brima II, supra note 5 at para. 189.
111    Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  581,  argues  that  the  violation  of  reproductive  autonomy  and  the  woman’s  
capacity to exercise control over her sexual activity and her own body is indicative of a sexual slavery
situation.
112 Denov, supra  note  6  at  10.  These  ﬁnding  are  from  three  research  projects  that  explored  the  unique  
realities  of  girls  aﬀected  by  armed  conﬂict  in  Angola,  Sierra  Leone,  and  Mozambique,  Sierra  Leone  
and Northern Uganda.
113     Valerie  Oosterveld  &  Andrea  Marlowe,  “International  Decisions”  (2007)  101  Am.  J.  Int’l  L.  848  at  
854.  
114     Rosalind  Dixon  “Rape  as  a  Crime  in  International  Humanitarian  Law:  Where  to  from  Here?”  in  
Gerry  Simpson  ed.  War Crimes Law  Vol.  I  (Ashgate  2004)  268,  as  cited  in  Bailliet,  supra  note  73  at  509.  
115    Robert  Li on,  “The  Concept  of  Survivor”,  in  Joel  E.  Dimsdale,  ed.,  Survivors,  Victims,  and  
Perpetrators:  Essays  on  the  Nazi  Holocaust  113,  123,  as  cited  in  Nowrojee,  supra  note  1  at  104.  
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tive  in  Sierra  Leone  reﬂects  the  pressing  need  for  a  naming  of  this  act  as  a  crime  so  that  
the  women  and  girls  taken  as  “wives”  are  not  forced  to  self-‐‑identify  as  such:  
We  have  to  recognize  that  maybe  these  girls  […]  were  taken  quite  young,  
and they don’t see any other option, but they do consider the men to be
their husbands, even if they don’t necessarily want to be with that man.
They still consider him to be their legitimate husband in some way. And
it’s older people and outside people who are saying that’s not a legitimate
marriage: just because you’ve been with him and you’ve been sleeping with
him and you have a child, it’s not a marriage [they say]. He is supposed
to  go  to  your  parent’s  house  and  ask  for  you  and  do  these  things,  which  is  
what  many  NGOs  have  been  encouraging  and  [also]  what  we’ve  [INGO,  
the  International  NonGovernmental  Organization]  been  encouraging  […]  
But  the  concept  that  they  are  wives  and  that  these  are  their  men  is  quite  
strong for them […] they don’t perceive themselves [as] at this point still
held against their will […] They’re choosing to stay with men because
they  have  no  idea  who  possibly  else  would  want  to  take  care  of  them,  and  
they’ve been told that nobody else would want them.116
The  naming  of  these  crimes,  and  their  prosecution  under  IHL,  thus  allows  for  “con-‐‑
ﬁrmation  to  the  victim  that  they  are  not  responsible  for  what  happened  to  them,  as  
well as the opportunity for the victim to tell their story.”117 This may have serious and
important  implications  for  the  wives’  reintegration  in  the  post-‐‑conﬂict  world,  in  that  it  
may  help  in  shi ing  the  stigma  of  “marriage”  onto  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime,  thus  
easing  the  burden  of  the  “wives”  in  terms  of  normalizing  their  relationships  with  their  
families and communities.118
Moreover,  without  this  speciﬁc  recognition  within  IHL,  the  international  community  
risks   sending   a   message  that   acts  of  gendered  violence,  done   within   the   conﬁnes  of  
“marriages”  during  war  time,  are  acceptable,119  making  it  plausible,  as  was  the  case  in  
Brima I,  to  argue  that  “marriages,”  even  if  forced,  render  any  acts  done  within  the  con-‐‑
ﬁnes  of  this  speciﬁc  institution  unprosecutable  and  thus  invisible,  once  again  silencing  
the  voices  of  these  “wives”:120
By  not  acknowledging  forced  marriage  at  all,  the  international  community  
116     Interview  with  Catherine  Wiesner,  June  5,  2002,  as  cited  in  McKay  &  Mazurana,  supra  note  31  at  
56.  
117    Gardam  &  Jarvis,  supra  note  4  at  131.  
118 Kalra, supra note 57 at 220.
119    Nadine  Dostrovsky,  et  al.,  Annotated Bibliography on Comparative and International Law Relating to
Forced Marriage (Department  of  Justice  Canada,  August  2007)  at  44.  
120 See Doherty Dissent, supra  note  14  at  para.  19,  which  shows  that  the  defendant,  Kanu,  relying  on  
expert evidence, argued that forced marriages could not be deemed of similar gravity to other crimes
against humanity due to the more nuanced relationship between husband and wife. Moreover, this
same  defendant  a empted  to  argue  that  this  could  not  be  a  crime  against  humanity  as  it  was  simply  a  
replication of customary marriage (ibid.  at  para.  36).  
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fails to provide a potential deterrent for future cases of forced marriage.
It may in fact create a loophole for combatants, who may claim women
as wives, rape them, and submit them to various forms of physical and
psychological   violence   with   impunity.      By   not   trying   these   crimes,   the  
international community sends a message that these acts are acceptable as
long as they are done under the guise of ‘marriage’.121
It has been argued by some scholars that naming the crime forced marriage is poten-‐‑
tially problematic in the sense that it can operate as a serious misnomer and serve to
inscribe the institution of marriage, more generally, with patriarchal views of what
it  means  to  be  a  “husband”  and  “wife.”    However,  it  should  be  noted  that  many  of  
the  women  and  girls  of  Sierra  Leone,  as  seen  in  the  stories  above,  self-‐‑identify  as  the  
“wives”   of   their   captors/“husbands,”   and   to   choose   another   label   under   IHL   would  
only  serve  to  further  mask  the  problem  and  undermine  the  project  of  giving  voice  to  
the  women  who  called  these  men  their  “husbands”  and  who  were,  in  turn,  named  their  
“wives.”122 Instead of calling forced marriage by another name to avoid incongruous
uses  of  the  term  “marriage,”  the  term  should  be  given  real  meaning  and  content  within  
IHL so that forced marriages cannot be equated with marriages more generally, and so
that women will not disappear into degrading, abusive, and violent relationships dur-‐‑
ing  armed  conﬂicts  under  the  guise  of  a  legitimate  social  institution.    
While it is recognized that the criminalization of acts at an international level, even
where there is vigorous prosecution, does not serve as a panacea, in that there is no
addressing  of  the  larger  socio-‐‑economic  and  cultural  issues  that  may  potentially  ren-‐‑
der  these  women  and  girls  more  vulnerable  to  becoming  captive  “wives”  in  the  ﬁrst  
place,123  I  argue  that  criminalization  is  a  necessary  ﬁrst  step  to  protecting  these  girls’  
and  women’s  rights  and  interests  during  armed  conﬂict  and  in  giving  them  a  voice  to  
express what has been done to them. The hope is that naming and prosecuting under
IHL  will  serve  in  helping  to  end  impunity  for  gender-‐‑based  crimes,  to  challenge  gen-‐‑
der stereotypes that aid in perpetuating gender violence, and to set important prec-‐‑
edent for future cases.124
121 Kalra, supra  note  57  at  203.  
122    See  Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  553,  for  the  argument  that  the  “term  ‘marriage’  is  a  criminal  misno-‐‑
mer  that  masks  what,  under  international  criminal  law,  was  clearly  a  situation  of  slavery.”    Also  see  
Nowrojee, supra  note  1  at  94,  who  argues  that  we  must  “take  care  that  patriarchal  gender  stereotypes  
of  a  wife’s  role,  such  as  household  cooking  and  cleaning,  are  not  inadvertently  incorporated  into  
jurisprudence  that  nominally  seeks  to  make  gains  for  women.”  
123   Amy E. Ray, Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia,  (1997)  46  Am.  U.L.  Rev.  793,  830,  as  
cited  in  Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  580,  notes,  for  example  that  “international  human  rights  law  through  
a war crimes tribunal addressed only one moment during entire lives of sexual discrimination and
sexual terrorism [and] it ignores each incident of sexual terrorism until a soldier representing a state
violates  women’s  rights  during  times  of  ‘war.’”  Others,  such  as  Park,  supra  note  10  at  316,  have  argued  
that  “international  law  is  not  a  silver  bullet  to  alleviate  the  structural  barriers,  constraints  and  chal-‐‑
lenges that entrench girls’ vulnerability in peacetime and wartime.”
124     Suzan  M.  Pritche ,  “Entrenched  Hegemony,  Eﬃcient  Procedure,  or  Selective  Justice?:  An  Inquiry  
into  Charges  for  Gender-‐‑Based  Violence  at  the  International  Criminal  Court”  (2008)  17  Transnat’l  L.  &  
Contemp.  Probs.  268  at  298.  

26  

What’s in a Name

Vol. 19

3. Influence on Other Legal Systems
While it is clear that the naming of forced marriage as an independent crime under
IHL  will  not  have  an  entirely  transformative  eﬀect  in  terms  of  gender  equality  or  the  
treatment of women and girls within society, as noted above, it is arguable that it can
play an important role as a precedent, not only in the international system, but for do-‐‑
mestic  systems  of  law  as  well.    As  Bélair  notes,  “giving  a  court  jurisdiction  over  a  crime  
of sexual [or gender] violence enables it to elaborate on the essence of such crime and
perhaps even generate progressive normative discourse”125 that may have repercus-‐‑
sions  elsewhere.    The  naming  of  this  speciﬁc  crime  under  IHL,  and  the  rendering  of  it  
more  visible,  could  contribute  to  the  ongoing  discourse  seeking  to  advance  the  protec-‐‑
tions of women at all levels of society by providing a counterpoint to the truism that
“violence  against  women  has  been  misconceived  as  a  private  thing,  an  incidental  thing,  
an unfortunate thing and a cultural thing. Anything but a human rights thing.”126 In
other words, it is plausible that viewing forced marriages as a crime may help draw
parallels  with  discriminatory  practices  that  exist  beyond  times  of  armed  conﬂict.    As  
Reynolds  notes,  “identifying  why  sexual  violence  remains  a  too  frequent  occurrence  in  
war builds a nexus with peacetime sexual violence: this would increase awareness of
how  to  confront  the  a itudes  and  images  that  perpetuate  violence  against  women.”127
It is conceded, of course, that the argument above is problematic. First, there may
be active state resistance to the notion of criminalizing forced marriage, both at an
international   level,   and   within   domestic   systems   of   law.      While   the   courts   in   Brima  
scrupulously  sought  to  distinguish  forced  marriages  during  armed  conﬂict  from  more  
traditional   “arranged”   marriages   in   times   of   peace   (where   the   former   are   rooted   in  
an  absence  of  consent  on  the  part  of  the  woman  or  girl’s  family  and  a  lack  of  formal  
ceremonies binding the spouses together),128 the distinctions drawn by the courts are
not  as  clear-‐‑cut  as  to  render  the  naming  of  forced  marriage  as  a  crime  unproblematic  in  
terms of state acceptance for those nations that could plausibly view this as an undue
interference   in   cultural   ma ers.      It   has   been   noted   by   several   authors,   for   example,  
that there was concerted resistance by a group of Arab states to the inclusion of the
crime of sexual slavery in the Rome Statute. These states sought to include an adden-‐‑
dum  to  the  deﬁnition  of  “ownership”  under  this  crime  so  as  to  exclude  any  possibility  
that the powers of ownership could be construed as including any reference to the

125    Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  585.
126     Margareth  Etienne,  “Addressing  Gender-‐‑Based  Violence  in  an  International  Context”  (1995)  18  
Harv.  Women’s  L.J.  139  at  158.  
127    Sarnata  Reynolds,  “Deterring  and  Preventing  Rape  and  Sexual  Slavery  During  Periods  of  Armed  
Conﬂict”  (1998)  16  Law  &  Ineq.  601  at  604.  
128 See Doherty Dissent, supra  note  14  at  para.  36,  where  she  argues  that,  “having  considered  the  
description of traditional marriages in parts of West Africa given by the Defence expert and the
evidence of both the Prosecution expert and the witnesses, I am of the view that the abduction of girls
and their coercion into marital unions […] is not the same nor comparable to arranged or traditional
marriages.  In  particular,  the  consent  of  the  girl  and/or  her  parents  is  not  sought,  there  is  no  involve-‐‑
ment  of  the  family  of  either  ‘spouse’  and  there  is  no  ceremony  or  ritual  fulﬁlled.”
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“rights,  duties,  and  obligations  incident  to  marriage  between  a  man  and  a  woman.”129
The overarching concern for these Arab states was in protecting cultural practices that
could plausibly be considered as comprising a crime against humanity under the new
deﬁnition  of  sexual  slavery:  
These states feared that the law on crimes against humanity was too
ambiguous and might be used by activist judges not simply to deal with
atrocities but as a tool of ‘social engineering’. These countries explained in
the negotiations that protecting religious or cultural practices and traditions
was  a  particular  priority.    In  some  of  the  Arab  states  making  the  proposal,  
national  laws  made  obtaining  a  divorce  more  diﬃcult  for  women  than  for  
men, and some cultural practices required wives to have their husbands’
permission to participate in public activities. These states were concerned
that an argument might be made that these practices amounted to sexual
slavery.130
The notion that forced marriage could constitute an independent crime under IHL
would assumedly draw the same concerns and criticisms, namely that the interna-‐‑
tional community, under the guise of IHL and international criminal law, was illegiti-‐‑
mately  a acking  customary  norms  and  practices.    Furthermore,  there  is  the  argument  
that an international tribunal is not instituted to address all  social  ills,  but  rather  “must  
maintain its focus on only the most serious international crimes if it is to maintain its
credibility and stature.”131 The deep connections between the institution of marriage
and cultural practice thus may render the criminalization and stigmatization of forced
marriages  inherently  diﬃcult  to  achieve,  particularly  at  the  level  of  state  acceptance  
and compliance with any new IHL standards.
Second, without a state’s or group’s willingness to accept the norms and principles that
underpin IHL, including any criminalization of forced marriages, the possibility of ac-‐‑
tually  aﬀecting  conduct  both  within  armed  conﬂict  and  in  times  of  peace  is  duly  com-‐‑
plicated.    For  an  eﬀective  change  to  occur  there  needs  to  be  a  sense  on  the  part  of  those  
engaging  in  such  practices  that  the  conduct  is,  in  fact,  criminal  behaviour;  or,  as  Packer  
argues, if groups are to feel morally compelled to comply with various laws, then
“they  must  believe  that  a  law  is  needed,  for  which  they  must  ﬁrst  be  convinced  that  
the practice is ‘wrong’.”132 If women are viewed as being entirely subordinated within

129 Oosterveld, supra  note  63  at  636.  
130   Ibid.  at  636.  
131     Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  580.  
132     Corinne  A.A.  Packer,  “Using  Human  Rights  to  Change  Tradition:  Traditional  Practices  Harmful  
to  Women’s  Reproductive  Health  in  Sub-‐‑Saharan  Africa”  (2002)  153,  as  cited  in  Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  
601.  
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marriages at all times based on traditional cultural practices and customs,133 then it is
arguable  that  any  law  under  IHL  that  seeks  to  eradicate  harmful  treatment  of  “wives”  
will  remain  practically  unenforceable  and  will  bear  li le  impact  on  domestic  systems,  
as the mistreatment of the women and girls under forced marriages will merely be a
“gross  magniﬁcation  of  ‘ordinary’  violence  and  a itudes,  not  an  aberration.”134
Nevertheless,  recognition  of  the  violations  done  under  the  name  of  “marriage”  within  
armed  conﬂict,  and  the  forced  imposition  of  this  label  itself,  must  be  understood  as  
constituting a serious crime. While certain cultural practices may violate women’s hu-‐‑
man  rights,  the  absolute  lack  of  consent  on  the  part  of  either  a  woman  or  her  family,  
or even her community, distinguish this practice from arranged marriages under cus-‐‑
tomary laws and should be viewed as criminal in nature. Furthermore, in addressing
this  issue  at  the  international  level,  there  is  hope  that  it  will  provide  the  “language  and  
law” required to conceptualize this degree of gender violence as harmful to women
and  girls,  even  when  accepted  domestically.    As  Bélair  argues,  “if  international  crimi-‐‑
nal  law  thus  serves  to  stimulate  reﬂection  on  the  need  to  bring  those  practices  to  the  
state’s  a ention,  and  on  the  best  way  to  eradicate  those  practices,  it  will  have  greatly  
contributed to the advancement of women’s rights on a national level.”135

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the phenomenon of forced marriages in
armed  conﬂict  situations,  drawing  on  the  experiences  of  the  women  and  girls  of  Sierra  
Leone  who  acted  as  the  “wives”  of  their  captor/“husbands,”  and  seeking  to  establish  
that this phenomenon is not merely a collection of various violations, but a serious
gender-‐‑based  crime  in  and  of  itself  that  requires  separate  recognition  as  such  within  
133   Sierra Leone has enshrined formal guarantees of rights and freedoms for women in its
Constitution (The Constitution of Sierra Leone,  1991  (Act.  No.  6  of  1991)  at  art.  15),  and  there  have  been  
recent legislative initiatives, such as The Child Rights Act, Supplement  to  the  Sierra  Leone  Gaze e  
Extraordinary  Vol.  CXXXVIII,  No.  43  dated  3rd  September,  2007,  regarding  the  rights  of  women  
and girls that suggest a new focus on substantive equality rights as well. The Child Rights Act, for
example,  sets  the  minimum  age  of  marriage  at  18  and  mandates  that  “no  person  shall  force  a  child  …  
to  be  married”  (art.  34(1)(c)),  on  penalty  of  criminal  punishment  (art.  35).  Nevertheless,  many  authors  
and  reports  have  pointed  to  “structural  discrimination  by  practice,  custom,  and  law”  and  the  fact  
that  “such  discrimination  pervaded  the  social,  political,  and  economic  public  se ing  as  well  as  in  the  
family. The TRC argued that the application of customary and statutory laws to women and girls, es-‐‑
pecially  in  the  ﬁeld  of  personal  law,  was  discriminatory  and  did  not  adequately  protect  them  against  
violence”  (Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  595).  The  TRC  has  further  argued  that  “the  abductions  and  use  of  
young girls and women as bush wives and sex slaves by armed groups during the war could be at-‐‑
tributed to the traditional beliefs that governed this issue prior to the war. Some of the armed groups
did not consider it an aberration to rape young women or use them as sex slaves” (TRC, supra note
18 at 85). Thus, while the new legislative changes are clearly positive developments, unless structural
changes  and  shi s  in  a itude  occur  as  well,  the  project  of  furthering  women’s  protections  and  rights  
within marriage will remain incomplete.
134     Bennoune,  supra  note  103  at  370.  
135     Bélair,  supra  note  3  at  606.  
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IHL.    While  it  is  acknowledged  that  questions  of  cultural  relativism  and  the  limitations  
of  IHL  itself  in  terms  of  its  ability  to  address  serious  gender  violence  with  long-‐‑lasting  
eﬀects  act  as  potential  roadblocks  to  an  eﬀective  criminalization  of  this  conduct  at  an  
international level, it is also contended that these arguments may simply be rooted
in  an  “ingrained  acceptance  of  the  boundaries  of  the  law,”136 which ought to be chal-‐‑
lenged if meaningful change is to occur in the lives of women and girls caught up in
armed  conﬂict.    
That said, however, while the stigmatization of forced marriages is an important step,
it also must be recognized that when it comes to a consideration of how to build, sus-‐‑
tain and promote sustainable peace, while addressing the needs of women within IHL,
there  is  an  imperative  to  “think  longitudinally,  comprehensively,  creatively  and  con-‐‑
textually”137 and to appreciate that no one single solution will address all of the needs
of the women and girls trapped in forced marriages. However, it is also essential to
consider  that  this  speciﬁc  naming  may  operate  as  “an  important  symbolic  and  legal  
gesture towards recognizing and advancing the rights of women and girls”138 and that
even moderate improvements in these same lives are at once desirable and feasible.

136     Gardam  &  Jarvis,  supra  note  4  at  106.  
137     Hayli  Millar,  “Facilitating  Women’s  Voices  in  Truth  Recovery:  An  Assessment  of  Women’s  
Participation  and  the  Integration  of  a  Gender  Perspective  in  Truth  Commissions”,  in  Durham  &  Gurd,  
supra note 8, 171 at 220.
138     Park,  supra  note  10  at  332.  

